By Norman Bordadora
Philippine Daily Inquirer; 01/19/2011
The government and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines have agreed to resume formal peace talks from February 15 to 21 in Oslo, Norway.
In a joint communiqué signed on January 18, government panel chairman Alexander Padilla and NDFP panel chairman Luis Jalandoni said both sides also agreed to recommend to their respective principals the implementation of a ceasefire during the talks.
The government panel also agreed to work for the expeditious release of detained NDFP consultants and other persons covered by the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees “in the spirit of goodwill.”
The two sides held preliminary talks from January 14 to 18, also in Oslo.
It would seem to many Filipinos that the peace negotiations between the government and the Communists have achieved nothing significant. Truth is, both panels have signed several important documents that should move the process forward. Would the Aquino administration genuinely commit to these earlier agreements?
The Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) have been engaged in peace negotiations for almost 25 years now. It has been a long process that, to many Filipinos, has seemingly achieved so little. After all, the Communist revolution is still raging in the countryside and the government has been trying all sorts of methods to suppress or defeat it.
In fact, much has been achieved in the peace process. The agreements and documents that both panels have signed in the past quarter of a century have been significant.
The GPH, then officially named Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), began peace talks with the NDFP soon after Corazon Cojuangco-Aquino took office after the first People Power uprising in 1986. As an act of goodwill, Aquino released hundreds of political prisoners, thus paving the way for the negotiations. The talks collapsed, however, after police fired upon protesting farmers on Jan. 22, 1987, in what is now known as the Mendiola Massacre.
Talks resumed in 1992, under the new administration of former general Fidel Ramos, when The Hague Joint Declaration was signed on Sept. 1 that same year. The agreement laid down the framework of the peace talks and the substantive agenda to be taken up.
Both parties agreed that formal peace negotiations between the GPH and the NDFP shall be held to resolve the armed conflict and that the common goal of the negotiations shall be the attainment of a just and lasting peace.
“The holding of peace negotiations must be in accordance with mutually acceptable principles, including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice and no precondition shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace negotiations,” the declaration states.
According to The Hague Joint Declaration, the substantive agenda of the formal peace negotiations shall include human rights and international humanitarian law, socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, end of hostilities and disposition of forces. These agenda should be tackled in that particular order.
Years after the Hague agreement was signed, the NDFP would invoke its provisions again and again, especially since the GPH, according to the front, repeatedly violated the spirit and the letter of the agreement. The NDFP is the umbrella organization of revolutionary groups in the Philippines, among them the Communist Party of the Philippines.
Next to be signed, on June 14, 1994 was the Breukelen Joint Statement. Here, confidence-building and goodwill measures are stated as voluntary undertakings of both parties. The NDFP asserts that political prisoners should not be treated and convicted as common criminals. In the Breukelen Joint Statement, too, the NDFP endorsed the indemnification of victims of human-rights violations under the Marcos dictatorship and proposed the allocation to the victims of at least 30 percent of whatever money recovered from Marcos’s ill-gotten wealth.
Under the Jasig, both parties have the inherent right to issue documents of identification to its negotiators, consultants, staffers, security and other personnel. Such documents, it says, shall be duly recognized as safe-conduct passes.
All persons with documents of identification or safe-conduct passes are guaranteed free and unhindered passage in all areas in the Philippines, and in traveling to and from the Philippines in connection with the performance of their duties in the negotiations, the Jasig states further.
Jasig also provides that upon presentation by the duly accredited person to any entity, authority or agent of the party concerned, the document of identification or safe-conduct pass shall be honored and respected and the duly accredited person shall be accorded due recognition and courtesy and allowed free and unhindered passage.
Immunity guarantees shall mean that all duly accredited persons of both parties are guaranteed immunity from surveillance, harassment, search, arrest, detention, prosecution and interrogation or any other similar punitive actions due to any involvement or participation in the peace negotiations.
But since Jasig was signed, the NDFP has been decrying the GPH’s violations. Under the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration, for instance, more than a dozen consultants and members of the NDFP peace panel and reciprocal working committees were arrested or abducted and charged with common crimes.
Recently, Tirso “Ka Bart” Alcantara, a top leader of the New People’s Army in the Southern Tagalog Region, was arrested by state agents. The NDFP has demanded his release, arguing that Alcantara is a holder of document of identification and, thus, covered by Jasig. The government countered by denying that Alcantara is covered by the Jasig and that the NDFP allegedly has the habit of putting in its list of negotiators or consultants arrested NPA leaders.
The first substantive agreement, which many considered a major breakthrough, was the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) signed by both parties on March 16, 1998.
In gist, the CARHRIHL states that both parties shall adhere to and be bound by the principles and standards embodied in international instruments on human rights. The agreement also “seeks to confront, remedy and prevent the most serious human rights violations in terms of civil and political rights, as well as to uphold, protect and promote the full scope of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
Other important provisions of the CARHRIHL include the GPH’s indemnification of martial-law victims, the repeal of repressive laws, decrees and issuances and a review on jurisprudence on warrantless arrest, among others. Unfortunately, none has been done so far in relation to these provisions.
The CARHRIHL also adopts provisions on generally accepted principles and standards of international humanitarian law.
The agreement also states the formation of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) that shall monitor the implementation of the CARHRIHL. The JMC was formed only in April 2004 and has not reconvened since then. Complaints have been filed against each party since then but the GPH has refused to reconvene the JMC to discuss alleged violations of both parties of the CARHRIHL. After the ouster of President Joseph Estrada in 2001, the GPH under Arroyo resumed formal peace talks with the NDFP in April that same year.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States had an impact on the peace talks. As part of its supposed global war on terror, the United States State Department designated in August 2002 the CPP, the NPA and Jose Maria Sison, who serves as chief political consultant of the NDFP in the negotiations, as terrorists or terrorist organizations. The Council of the European Union and other states followed suit. Then Foreign Affairs Secretary Blas F. Ople admitted that a “special team” that he headed campaigned for the inclusion of CPP, NPA and Sison in the terror lists of the European member states.
In January 2003, the GPH offered the so-called Final Peace Accord (FPA) with the NDFP. The 29-page FPA specifically asks the NDFP to submit a roster of NPA guerillas and an inventory of firearms and demobilize the NPA within six months. The NDFP viewed the FPA as move to force the NDFP into capitulation. It also said that the accord is in violation of the Hague Joint Declaration, which states that disposition of forces — which was in effect what the government wanted to achieve – is the last agenda to be taken up in the negotiations.
In February and April 2004, two joint statements were issued in Oslo, Norway. Both parties reaffirmed the Hague Joint Declaration, the Jasig, the CARHRIHL and seven other agreements. The GPH agreed to “take effective measures” to resolve the issue of terrorist listing in order to advance the peace talks.
Upon arriving in Manila, though, the GPH, through presidential adviser on the peace process Secretary Teresita Deles, insisted that the inclusion of the CPP, NPA and Sison in foreign terror lists were “sovereign acts of these states, independent of the GRP disposition regarding these matters.” NDFP peace panel chairman Luis Jalandoni reacted by saying Deles’s statements smacked of “treachery, malice and deception.”
Just the same, both parties agreed to accelerate the work of the respective reciprocal working committees (RWCs) for the socio-economic reforms agenda.
The Oslo agreements also called for the indemnification of victims of human-rights violations under the Marcos regime: the segregation of US$150 million or at least PhP8 billion from the recovered Marcos ill-gotten wealth to compensate the victims, and for the GPH to exert its utmost initiative to obtain passage of an administration bill for the compensation of martial-law victims of human-rights violations.
In August 2005, the talks collapsed after the GPH refused to abide by previously signed agreements and insisted on an indefinite ceasefire as a precondition for any resumption. The NDFP said this was a violation of the Hague Joint Declaration.
It is interesting to note that not a single agreement was signed by both panels in the nine years of the Arroyo administration. The Arroyo regime instead opted for a militarist solution to the armed conflict with the implementation of the counterinsurgency programs Oplan Bantay Laya 1 and 2. The CPP, on the other hand, declared these programs a failure.
Would the GPH, under the new Aquino administration, abide by the previously signed agreements? The first Joint Communique seems promising but it remains to be seen whether the GPH would make true on these prior commitments.
A peace advocacy group in Mindanao expressed hopes that the resumption of peace talks between the government and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) will address the roots of economic injustices in the south.
The Initiatives for Peace (InPeace) in Mindanao, an interfaith grassroots group, welcomed the resumption of peace negotiations between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and NDFP set on February 15 to 21 in Oslo, Norway.
The group initiated the Mindanao Leaders’ Peace Conference in Cagayan de Oro from January 23 to 25.
InPeace chairman Bishop Felixberto Calang said the resumption of the talks is a welcome venue to address issues of Mindanao that are at the core of the conflict, such as landlessness and exploitation of resources by multinational-operated mining and plantations. Next in the agenda of the formal talks is the drafting of an agreement on socio-economic reforms.
“We are looking forward to a settlement on social and economic reforms by the inking of the draft Comprehensive Agreement on Socio-Economic Reforms. In Mindanao where majority of the poor are peasants, and where national minorities such as the Bangsamoro and Lumads are part of its cultural and social milieu, the talks are a most welcome venue to address issues close to our hearts and communities, namely, genuine agrarian reform and the right to self-determination,” said Calang in a statement.
Top, the Mindanao Leaders Peace Conference expressed optimism about the peace process. Above, from left, Joel Virador of Bayan Muna-SMR, Satur Ocampo of Makabayan Coalition and InPeace chairman Bishop Felixberto Calang.(Photo by InPeace / bulatlat.com)
“This is the most substantive agenda of the talks, so we must do our part as stakeholders to peace, and push the agenda of social justice,” Calang added.
The bishop also urged the various sectors of Mindanao to do their part in the talks by voicing the people’s agenda in forums and in consultations to be initiated by the panels. He said that InPeace will launch peace forums as its mandate to reach out to the grassroots to put out their agenda on the talks.
InPeace also urged both panels to look into the issue of human-rights violations and the US military’s presence and intervention in Mindanao. –Ronalyn V. Olea
Last December 22, 2010, President Benigno Aquino III unveiled the new Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) that would replace the bloody Oplan Bantay Laya. The plan was called Oplan Bayanihan, and was touted as a “paradigm shift” for the AFP. As if to stress the shift, the AFP is no longer using the term “Internal Security Plan” or ISP. It has added the word “peace” to the concept, hence IPSP. The term IPSP is also often used instead of “counter-insurgency”.
What is Oplan Bayanihan?
Oplan Bayanihan is the new Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) that aims to “provide the strategic guidance in the performance of (the AFP’s) mandated functions of protecting the state and the people. It shall help AFP units in planning for and contributing to the attainment of internal peace and security.”
As with previous ISP’s like Bantay Laya, Oplan Bayanihan is the AFP framework in dealing with so-called armed “threat groups”. Bayanihan classifies “threat groups” into three: “ideology-based groups” such as the CPP-NPA-NDF, the MILF and “rogue” MNLF factions; “terrorist” groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, JI and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations; and last, the “auxiliary threat groups” which include “partisan armed groups”, private armies and some criminal groups.
The new Oplan has eight main sections: Purpose, Strategic Environment, National Strategic Guidance, National Defense Strategy, Strategic Assumptions, AFP Mission for Internal Peace and Security, AFP Strategy for Internal Peace and Security and Conclusion.
The AFP says that Oplan Bayanihan is a public document which aims to gather support from various stakeholders. We were able to request a copy of the document through the AFP’s Civil Relations Service. The “public” document of course does not include the implementing guidelines of the new Oplan.
What are its salient features?
Oplan Bayanihan claims to take its cue from the pronouncements of President Benigno Aquino III calling for a “multi-stakeholder approach to peace and security”. It says that the current administration’s national security thrust involves four specific elements: governance, delivery of basic services, economic reconstruction and sustainable development, and security sector reform.
The new IPSP also claims to espouse a “whole-of-nation” and “people-centered” approach, implying that it is different from the previous ISP’s that espoused an “enemy-centric approach.”
Bayanihan says that it seeks the involvement of various stakeholders, “from the national and local government agencies, non-government entities and the entire citizenry, in addressing peace and security concerns”. It also claims to give “equal emphasis to combat and non-combat dimensions of military operations”. It claims to be a “departure from the old parameters and explores non-combat parameters of success in addressing the country’s peace and security problem.”
The AFP has been fighting a four-decade old armed rebellion led by the CPP-NPA-NDF. Despite the promise of every president since Marcos regarding the defeat of the revolutionary movement, no president has ever succeeded in delivering on this promise. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo attempted during her last three years and failed. This much was admitted by the AFP when it failed to meet its self-imposed deadline on defeating the revolutionary movement.
What is the ultimate objective of Oplan Bayanihan?
Bayanihan’s “end-state” or ultimate objective is the reduction of the “capabilities of internal armed threats…to a level that they can no longer threaten the stability of the state and civil authorities can ensure the safety and well-being of the Filipino people.”
The IPSP‘s objectives vary for the different armed groups. Bayanihan seeks the “defeat” of terrorist groups like the ASG, a negotiated settlement with the MILF, and the “rendering of the NPA irrelevant.”
Oplan Bayanihan is to be implemented from 2011-2016, with the first three years devoted to addressing the internal armed “threat groups”. The “substantial completion” of the objectives for the first three years will supposedly allow the AFP to “hand over the lead role in ensuring internal peace and security to appropriate government agencies and eventually allow the AFP to initiate its transition to a territorial defense-focused force. “ After the first three years, the plan says the AFP should be able to focus on external threats.
How does Oplan Bayanihan aim to achieve its goal?
Oplan Bayanihan “emphasizes that the primary focus in the conduct of military operations is Winning the Peace and not just defeating the enemy. In order to win the peace, the AFP IPSP shall be anchored on two strategic approaches: The Whole of Nation Approach and the People-Centered Security/Human Security Approach.”
“The Whole of Nation Approach is the framework that shall guide how the AFP will implement this IPSP.” This means that the AFP intends to mobilize all the so-called “stakeholders”, both government and non-government, to meet its objectives.
The “People-Centered Approach” meanwhile uses the concept of “human security” which it says intends to meet the needs of the people, including economic development, human rights and so on.
Oplan Bayanihan calls the use of the “people-centered approach” a paradigm shift or a “new” strategy for the AFP.
To achieve its goal, the AFP says it will be guided by two “strategic imperatives” and four courses of action called “strategic concepts”. The two strategic imperatives are “Adherence to Human Rights/International Humanitarian Law and the Rule of Law and Involvement of all Stakeholders”.
The four strategic concepts or courses of action are “Contribute to the Permanent and Peaceful Closure of all Armed Conflict” which stresses the “primacy of the peace process”; “Conduct of Focused Military Operations” against threat groups; Support Community-based Peace and Development Efforts” and lastly, “Security Sector Reform (SSR)”.
Grand deception and continuing violence
Oplan Bayanihan is a grand psy-war scheme that aims to continue state-sponsored violence against the people, this time with more reliance on deception and cooptation.
Bayanihan is a tacit admission of the failures of the previous Oplan Bantay Laya, especially in terms of its military objectives of defeating the armed rebellion in the country.
Bantay Laya has also been exposed as the framework by which extrajudicial killings and abductions of unarmed activists have been carried out in the name of internal security operations. The previous ISP was responsible for the bloody human rights record of the AFP under Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
The so-called paradigm shift however is not entirely new, nor is it an innovation of the AFP. Bayanihan uses concepts lifted from the US Counter-Insurgency Guide of 2009 formulated by the US Inter-agency Counter-Insurgency Initiative which includes the US Department of Defense, US State Department and the USAID.
The US COIN Guide of 2009 defines counter-insurgency as the “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes”.
“Best practice COIN integrates and synchronizes political, security, economic, and informational components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing insurgent influence over the population”.
“COIN strategies should be designed to simultaneously protect the population from insurgent violence; strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of government institutions to govern responsibly and marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and economically”.
The use of a multi-stakeholder approach supposedly to “win the peace” and promote “human security” only means the AFP will more frequently employ non-combat military operations alongside combat operations as well as non-government efforts alongside government efforts. The end goal is control over the population and environment through deception and suppression. By embarking on so-called “developmental work”, the AFP hopes to “win the sentiments” of the people and “leverage” them against the revolutionary forces.
The so-called thrusts and “strategic guidance” made by the commander-in-chief namely good governance, delivery of services, sustainable development, and security sector reform; are also inspired by the US COIN guide. These fall under the counterinsurgency model’s “functional components”: economic function, political function, security function and information function. The end goal is the “control of the environment”.
The US COIN guide describes these elements as follows:
The political function is the key function, providing a framework of political reconciliation, and reform of governance around which all other COIN activities are organized.
The economic function seeks to provide essential services and stimulate long-term economic growth, thereby generating confidence in the government while at the same time reducing the pool of frustrated, unemployed young men and women from which insurgents can readily recruit.
The security function is an enabler for the other functions and involves development not just of the affected nation’s military force, but its whole security sector, including the related legal framework, civilian oversight mechanisms and judicial system.
The information function comprises intelligence (required to gain understanding), and influence (to promote the affected government’s cause).
Flawed premises
Oplan Bayanihan is based on flawed premises and a denial of the historical roots and basis of the armed conflict in the country. Oplan Bayanihan offers no clear and precise analysis of why people take up arms against the government in the first place. Failing to understand the root causes of the armed conflict will inevitably lead to a failed response.
In the section on “Strategic Environment” which deals with the socio-economic and socio-political context of the armed conflict, Bayanihan describes the “economic environment” of the country. It admits that there is “inequitable distribution of wealth and unequal economic opportunities” that “result in a wide income gap between social classes”.
However, Bayanihan also says that “there is no direct causal link between low economic status and armed conflict”. What exists are “perceptions of relative deprivation” which are “correlated with the emergence and persistence of conflict in the Philippines”.
For the AFP, it is the “perception of relative deprivation” and not concrete socio-economic and political issues like landlessness, unemployment and injustice that drive people to take up arms against the government. For the AFP, solving the “root causes” of armed conflict boils down to changing people’s perceptions without having to change their socio-economic conditions.
For example, building a road in a barrio can create the perception of development even if farmers remain landless and at the mercy of their landlords.
Even injustice is perceived by the AFP as a mere “exploitable” issue by the revolutionary forces. To again quote Oplan Bayanihan, “the slow dispensation of justice, especially in rural areas pushes people to rely on extra-legal means of retribution and restitution.. For instance, parochial concerns such as land disputes can escalate and lead to the degeneration of internal peace and security in a wider area. The inadequacies in the justice system therefore provide threat groups another exploitable issue to discredit the government and encourage armed dissent.”
Land disputes, such as those in Hacienda Luisita, cannot be considered parochial or simply an “exploitable issue” against government. The issue of landlessness has historical roots based on state policies and is the biggest hindrance to national development and poverty eradication. The AFP and the government policy-makers show an utter lack of understanding of this social phenomenon, and whatever response they may undertake will likely be superficial.
The “development work” advocated by Oplan Bayanihan is not aimed at addressing the socio-economic and socio-political root causes of rebellion nor is it aimed at changing the economic conditions of the people. The aim is to change the people’s “perceptions” of government towards “winning their sentiments” while marginalizing the “insurgents”. There is a common term for this. It’s called psy-war.
“Whole-of-nation approach”
Oplan Bayanihan professes a paradigm shift through its “whole of nation” and “people-centered” approach. These concepts are not entirely new and are lifted from the US Counter-Insurgency Guide of 2009.
The US Interagency COIN Initiative uses the “whole of government, whole of society” concept in carrying out counter-insurgency operations. It also distinguishes between an “enemy-centric approach” and a “people-centered approach”
The “whole of nation approach” aims to engage the different stakeholders who will share the concept, responsibility and burden of achieving peace and security. Bayanihan describes the stakeholders as the government, the non-government organizations and “civil society” groups and “the entire Filipino citizenry”. It aims to harmonize (shared concept) and mobilize (shared responsibility) both government and non-government assets for the counter-insurgency thrusts of the AFP.
The IPSP enumerated the different government agencies whose “function and roles directly impinge on internal peace and security”.
The DILG is said to take the lead in the matter of good governance. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process or OPAPP helps in facilitating peace negotiations while the DFA gets foreign support for the counter-insurgency initiatives. The DSWD will assist internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other individuals affected by armed conflict. The DPWH will be involved for the construction of infrastructure while the DOH and DepEd will be involved in the delivery of other services.
Other government agencies that are considered important in achieving “peace and security” are the DAR, DA, NEDA, NCIP, NCMF, the CHR and the recently created Presidential Communications Group.
It would be interesting to see how the CHR will play a role, if any, in all of this. The CHR is supposed to be an independent commission and has no business being employed in AFP counter-insurgency operations.
Other government stakeholders are the LGU’s which are described as being “closes to the people and most critical actors in the attainment of internal peace and security”. They are said to be responsible for the “satisfaction or perception of deprivation of the local populace”. Again, here we note that it is merely the “perception of deprivation” that Bayanihan is concerned with, nothing more.
Lastly, there are the AFP and PNP, the main pillars in the counterinsurgency drive.
As for the non-government stakeholders, Bayanihan believes that NGO’s and CSO’s “fill the gaps in the dispensation of tasks and functions of the national government agencies and local governments”. As such, they will be utilized in the counter-insurgency campaign for the “delivery of services” and “sustainable development” projects.
As for the third stakeholder, “the entire Filipino people”, Bayanihan considers them the ultimate beneficiaries of the internal peace and security efforts” and thus their participation is “imperative”.
“People-centered approach” and “human security”
Bayanihan claims to be “people-centered” , focusing their so-called “human security” which is broadly defined as “freedom from fear and freedom from want”. Bayanihan claims to put the people’s welfare “at the center of its operations”.
This concept is also derived from the US COIN Guide which uses the term “population-centric approach” as differentiated from the “enemy-centric approach”. It defines enemy-centric to mean emphasis on the “defeat of the enemy as its primary task and other activities as supporting efforts.”
Meanwhile, a population-centric approach means “to shift the focus…from defeating the insurgent organization to maintaining or recovering the support of the population.”
However the US COIN guide says that in reality, counterinsurgency campaigns “are rarely purely enemy-centric or “population-centric” and will require a combination of both approaches.
Under the “whole of nation, people-centered approach”, programs such as the “conditional cash transfer” can be used as counter-insurgency tools given their palliative but ‘high-impact’ nature. Infrastructure projects, such as the US MCC-funded road construction in Samar can also fall within the scope of counter-insurgency operations (as admitted by the local AFP themselves).
There is also the concern that Oplan Bayanihan will militarize the delivery of services and “development work” done by government agencies and non-government organizations. “Development work” in communities can also be used as a cover for intelligence gathering and profiling of residents. It would also be interesting to know the kind of NGO’s that will engage the AFP within the framework of Bayanihan.
This early, reports that the AFP’s “peace and development teams” implementing Oplan Bayanihan in Davao del Norte and Compostela Valley have been conducting ‘census’ activities in the community, extracting information from a local NGO. The local NGO Sildap cried harassment after they were repeatedly visited by fully-armed soldiers who were trying to extract information.
Combat and non-combat operations
Bayanihan claims that while it gives equal importance to non-military multi-stakeholder approach in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, there will be “no diminution in the importance of combat operations”. However, these would be more “focused” and “tailored” to meet particular “threat groups”.
As the US COIN guide says, “COIN functions… include informational, security, political and economic components, all of which are designed to support the overall objective of establishing and consolidating control over the environment.”
The IPSP calls for the use of “focused military operations against armed threat groups”. The military operations take on the form of combat operations complemented by a wide array of non-combat initiatives aimed at establishing control over the environment.
Make no mistake, the AFP will continue to use force and state violence, but this time couched in concepts such as “sustainable development”. It vows the “intensified and relentless pursuit of the NPA”.
The AFP’s Special Operations Teams “shall transition to peace and development teams (PDT)” and will be at the “forefront” of Bayanihan. The AFP will also continue to implement the Triad Operations concept of simultaneous conduct of combat, intelligence and civil-military operations (CMO).
Bayanihan defines CMO’s as “planned activities undertaken independently or in coordination with civilian entities in support to(sic) the accomplishment of AFP mission to gain popular support and weaken the will of the enemy to fight. It is characterized by activities that influence the beliefs, emotion, behaviors, attitudes and opinions of selected target audience; it establishes and maintains good relations between military forces, civil authorities and the civilian populace to facilitate military operations in support to the accomplishment of the AFP mission”.
Bayanihan aims to apply “social pressure” on the NPA, for them to abandon armed struggle. The AFP invokes a patently ahistorical assertion that “the use of armed struggle to attain political ends is not acceptable to the Filipino people and to any civilized society”.
In relation to the NPA, the IPSP recommends the use of non-combat military activates involving “public information campaigns, civic action programs, development related projects and collaborative activities with government and non-government stakeholders, among others.”
We have seen how these programs were implemented during the urban militarization of Metro Manila in 2007. The AFP CMO’s conducted an aggressive vilification (information) campaign against legal progressive groups while conducting civic action programs like school repairs and roadworks. The presence of fully-armed soldiers was intended to intimidate residents. Civic projects were also used to gather intelligence info on the community residents.
Peace negotiations
The AFP says that the internal security operations “shall be within the national government’s peace framework” and that the military will subscribe to the “primacy of the peace process”.
In the context of Bayanihan, the peace process is viewed as the only viable option for the NPA when it realizes the “futility of their armed struggle”. The goal is to “pressure” the NPA into engaging the peace negotiations and into accepting a framework of surrender or capitulation.
Conversely, Oplan Bantay Laya also raises questions as to the sincerity of the national government when it engages in peace negotiations with the NDF. It appears that the government peace efforts are only aimed at getting the NDF and the revolutionary forces to capitulate, and not at seriously addressing the root causes of the armed conflict.
The AFP vows to pursue its primary role in the peace process, that of ensuring that “the group with whom the government is talking peace with will not use force or the threat of force as leverage at the negotiating table”. The AFP will continue to employ armed force as a necessary means for the Philippine government to gain the upper hand in the peace talks.
Human Rights
Oplan Bayanihan makes repeated reference to the observance of human rights and international humanitarian law, calling them “imperatives” in the pursuit of internal peace and security. It claims that its use of force “will always be within the bounds… of IHL, HR and the rule of law”. It calls for the establishment of Human Rights Offices or desks down to the battalion level. The AFP also vows to use of “deliberate, accurate and precise” military operations aimed “only against armed insurgents”.
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Take the case of, the 19th IB’s less-than-accurate operations in Kanangga, Leyte that led to the killing of top botanist Leonard Co and two companions last November 15, 2010. The case has not been resolved and the AFP has since claimed that the death was the result of an alleged crossfire with the NPA even if testimonies and evidence point otherwise. There has been no result in the internal investigation of the AFP, if any was conducted at all. No official has been made accountable.
There also appears to be no change in the way the AFP views the legal progressive organizations as being “communist fronts”. There is no explicit “paradigm shift” in this regard. This lays the conditions for the continued attacks on unarmed activists. Even under the Aquino government, attacks against legal and unarmed activists have continued in the form of extrajudicial killings, illegal arrests and the filing of trumped up charges.
Further studies
What is disturbing and dangerous with the US COIN guide is that it allows a wide range of US intervention in the internal affairs of a country. Oplan Bayanihan, being inspired by the US COIN Guide, allows such forms of intervention whether as advisory roles, civil-military assistance or direct intervention. Foreign development aid can be poured into the country to boost the counterinsurgency thrusts of the Aquino government.
Another interesting area of study and research would be on the types of NGO’s that engage the AFP in the framework of Bayanihan. How independent are they to the national government? What type of foreign funding do they receive? How do they conduct their “development work”?
Conclusions
The AFP’s Oplan Bayanihan is a reflection of the socio-economic and socio-political thrusts of the current Aquino administration. It is only as effective as the framework of governance being offered by the ruling regime. Since Aquino has not addressed the basic issues at the root of the armed conflict, such as land reform, national industrialization, national sovereignty, social justice and genuine democracy, the counterinsurgency program will continue to fail in meeting its objectives. Aquino’s adherence to neo-liberal policies and subservience to foreign dictates will only worsen the domestic crisis and provide basis for the persistence of the armed conflict.
With the new IPSP, deception will go hand in hand with state-sponsored violence. Bayanihan will use combat and non-combat operations as well as government and non-government efforts to achieve the end goal of containing armed rebellion. Bayanihan denies the historical root causes of the armed conflict, treating them as a mere problems of “perception of relative deprivation”. Whatever “development” that the IPSP advances will only be superficial and aimed at deceiving the people in order to control and suppress them.
